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THE DEBTOR'S DILEMMA: DISPOSABLE INCOME
AS THE COST OF CHAPTER 13 DISCHARGE IN
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Joseph P. Corish * &
Michael J. Herbert**

I. INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984'
("BAFJA") reformed, or at any rate revised, a number of key provisions
in the Bankruptcy Code.2 While phenomenal attention has been paid to
the restrictions it placed on the unilateral rejection of union contracts
by debtors, and a good deal to the revision of the Bankruptcy Courts'

jurisdictional grant, only a few studies have dealt in any detail with the
major changes BAFJA made to the law of consumer bankruptcy.' This
is perhaps surprising, because those changes have far broader impact

(if rather less glamour).
Many of the consumer bankruptcy amendments were designed to

rein in what some creditors saw as an excessive liberality toward debtors
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I. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326
(1982 & Supp. 1986)).
2. In this article, "Code" or "Bankruptcy Code" refers to Title I1 of the United
States Code, I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. 1986). "Act" or "Bankruptcy Act"
refers to former Title II, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1979).
3. Some of the more extensive treatments of the changes made by BAFJA are:
Black & Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A Critique of the 1984 Consumer Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. 845 (1985); Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial
Abuse," (pts. I & 2) 59 Am. Bankr. L.J. 327 (1985), 60 Am. Bankr. L.J. 33 (1986);
and Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments
Act of 1984, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 91 (1985).
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in the original Bankruptcy Code.4 One of their targets was Chapter 13.1
Chapter 13 is roughly comparable to Chapter 11,6 in that both govern
"reorganization" bankruptcy proceedings, in which the debtor is allowed

to retain assets in exchange for payments to be made to creditors from
the debtor's future income. As such, both differ from Chapter 77 "liquidation" bankruptcies, in which the debtor loses non-exempt assets but
is generally freed from any further obligation to pay.' Chapter 13 is
designed primarily, but not exclusively, for consumer reorganizations; 9
Chapter 11 is designed for business reorganizations but can probably
be used by at least some consumers.10

Traditionally, unsecured creditors have 'favored reorganization
bankruptcies" because such proceedings hold out the promise (if not
always the reality) of higher payment.' 2 Indeed, what little systematic
evidence there is suggests that successful consumer reorganizations produce, or at least propose, strikingly greater returns to creditors than do
liquidations." Creditors, however, were not delighted by the Code's

4. See, e.g., Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 327-44; Black & Herbert, supra note 3,
at 845-51.
5. II U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1986). This article will also, from time
to time, refer to the cognate provisions of the prior Bankruptcy Act, Chapter XlIIBankruptcy Act §§ 601-686, II U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086 (1976) (repealed 1979).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
7. Id. §§ 701-766.
8. This is not entirely true, since some debts are not dischargeable in Chapter 7
proceedings. Id. § 523.
9. Chapter 13 can be used to reorganize the financial affairs of some small proprietorships. See generally, Herbert, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 13: Some
Second Thoughts, 10 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 603 (1985); Moller, It Isn't Only for Wage
Earners Anymore: The Individual in Business and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code,
17 Hous. L. Rev. 331 (1980).
10. With regard to the eligibility of consumer debtors for Chapter II proceedings,
see generally, Herbert, Consumer Chapter II Proceedings: Abuse or Alternative?, 91 Com.
L.J. 234 (1986).
I1. So much so that some creditor organizations supported a proposal to make Chapter
13 proceedings mandatory for some consumer debtors. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
12. The actual payment, of course, depends in large measure upon whether the plan
succeeds or fails. Although little systematic data exists with regard to the success rate of
Chapter 13 plans, it is said to be 50% or less. Countryman, Legal Relief: Straight
Bankruptcy and Wage Earner Plans, 26 Bus. Law. 933, 939 (1971) (Chapter XIII plans);
Girth, The Bankruptcy Reform Process: Maximizing Judicial Control in Wage Earners'
Plans, il U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 51, 58-60 (1977) (Chapter XIII plans).
13. The General Accounting Office's study of consumer bankruptcy under the Code
found that, on average, Chapter 13 plans promised payment of 57 percent of the amount
of unsecured claims. U. S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-A Before
and After Look 45 (1983) [hereinafter GAO Report] (Figures on the actual payments
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original version of Chapter 13. There were at least two reasons for this
dissatisfaction.
First, it was not clear that Chapter 13 required the debtor to pay
creditors more than they would get in liquidation. A large number of
courts ruled that a so-called zero-payment or nominal-payment Chapter
13 plan was permissible. 4 This meant that the debtor was permitted to
retain his assets for little or nothing, and to stretch whatever payments
he did happen to make over a three-year period. 5 Second, the discharge
awarded a Chapter 13 debtor is usually much broader than that given
a Chapter 7 or individual Chapter 11 debtor. 6 Debts arising out of
fraudulent conduct, for example, can be discharged only in Chapter 13
proceedings. Those courts that permitted nominal payment plans thus
permitted a debtor to discharge an otherwise non-dischargeable debt for
no additional cost.
These problems, if problems they were,'" might have been resolved
without legislative action. Chapter 13 plans must be confirmed by the

made by debtors are not given in the GAO Report.). Chapter 7 cases rarely provide any
money at all; according to the GAO Report, in 97 percent of such cases there are no
assets available for distribution to creditors. Id. at 56-57. See also, D. Stanley & M.
Girth, Bankruptcy: Problems, Process, Reform 87-88 (1971) (840o of liquidation cases
under the Bankruptcy Act provided for no distribution to creditors.); cf. Girth, supra
note 12, at 55-61 (case study of Chapter XIII plans in Buffalo, New York, during 197175).
14. Prior to BAFJA, Chapter 13's minimum payout requirement was found in §
1325(a)(4), which required, as a condition of confirmation, that
the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than
the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date.
II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982).
Many of the numerous cases on this issue are collected and critiqued in 5 Collier on
Bankruptcy 11325.0412] (L. King 15th ed. 1986).
15. The normal duration of a Chapter 13 plan is three years. II U.S.C. § 1322(c)
(1982).
16. Under I I U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986), individual debtors under Chapters
7 and 11 remain obligated on a laundry list of nondischargeable debts ranging from
certain tax obligations to certain student loans to money judgments deriving from injuries
caused by drunk driving. In Chapter 13, by contrast, the debtor is normally discharged
from all obligations except certain long-term debts and those arising from alimony,
maintenance or support. Id. § 1328(a). Cf. the narrower "hardship discharge" of id. §
1328(b),(c), which peculiarly leaves the economically less fit debtor subject to the full
weight of § 523(a).
17. The magnitude of the problems was subject to much dispute. For example, the
only comprehensive "before and after" study of the Code found that the debtors using
Chapter XIII of the old Bankruptcy Act proposed payments averaging 92 percent of their
unsecured debts, while debtors using Chapter 13 of the Code proposed payments averaging
57 percent of their unsecured debts. GAO Report, supra note 13, at 46. Both before and
after debtors proposed to pay far more than would have been paid in the typical liquidation.
See supra note 13.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

bankruptcy court; accordingly, a number of courts refused to confirm
nominal payment plans on the ingenious, if perhaps dubious, ground
that they were not proposed in "good faith."'" Many other bankruptcy
courts permitted such plans. The risk of deforestation caused by publication of the seemingly innumerable cases and articles that carried on
this debate was largely ended by BAFJA.19
The amended version of Section 1325 of the Code, which sets out
the prerequisites for plan confirmation, imposes on the debtor the requirement that either he pay any unsecured creditor who objects to
confirmation of the plan the allowed amount of her claim, or that he
devote all of his projected disposable income for the succeeding three
years to making payments under the plan.20 It is this new cost of
discharge which is the subject of this article. What is disposable income?
What effect does the requirement have on the utility of Chapter 13 to
consumer debtors?2 ' Does Section 1325 still permit nominal payment

18. Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is possible only if the plan was "proposed
in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982).
Most of the better reasoned cases held that this requirement was limited to an investigation
of the fairness of the plan creation process rather than a measure of the plan payments.
5 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 14.
19. But see infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
20. The relevant provision reads in full:
(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as
of the effective date of the plan(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable
income to be received in the three-year period beginning on the date
that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make
payments under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, "disposable income" means income which
is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor; or
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation
of such business.
I1 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1986). Note that the Code's penchant for inane English
is well evidenced by the wording of § 1325(b)(2)(B).
21. Because reported cases concerning business Chapter 13 proceedings are quite rare
(indeed, those discussing the measure of disposable income in such proceedings seem to
be non-existent), and because the potential special problems of the disposable income
standard in such proceedings have been speculatively discussed elsewhere (Herbert, supra
note 9, at 611-26), this article is solely concerned with the disposable income standard
in consumer Chapter 13 proceedings. It is worth noting, however, that in the twelve
months ending June 30, 1985, there were 7,124 "business" Chapter 13 filings. Report of
the Judicial Conference of the United States 464 (1985).
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plans? The answers to these questions will determine whether BAFJA
eliminated debtor abuses-or merely discouraged consumer debtor reorganization.

II.
A.

THE MEANING OF "DISPOSABLE

INCOME"

Background

Modern American bankruptcy law is somewhat paradoxical in nature.
It attempts, on the one hand, to provide debtors with a financial "fresh
start"; 22 on the other, to provide an orderly and equitable method of
asset collection and distribution. The bankruptcy system is asked simultaneously to serve as a kind of welfare program for the chronically
or suddenly impoverished and as a low-fee collection agency for those
whom the debtor cannot pay.23

22. The classic articulation of the fresh start concept is usually said to be that
contained in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 54 S. Ct. 695 (1934):
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to "relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."
...

The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and those

dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal liberty quite as much as,
if not more than, it is a property right. To preserve its free exercise is of the
utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental private necessity, but
because it is a matter of great public concern. From the viewpoint of the wage
earner there is little difference between not earning at all and earning wholly
for a creditor. Pauperism may be the necessary result of either. . . . The new
opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which is the purpose
of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little value
to the wage earner if he were obliged to face the necessity of devoting the
whole or a considerable portion of his earnings for an indefinite time in the
future to the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy.
Id. at 244-45, 54 S. Ct. at 699 (citation omitted).
23. There are many thoughtful studies of this problem and of the complex historical
evolution of bankruptcy from a more pure collection system to the present hybrid; serious
scholarly interest in the subject extends at least as far back as 1918. See F. Noel, A
History of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America
(1918) (unpublished dissertation) (available at the Virginia State Library, Richmond, Virginia) and C. Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History (1935). An excellent primer
on the subject is Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States:
The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 West Va. L. Rev. 427 (1974). A somewhat more recent and
extremely brief study, largely derived from Noel and Warren, can be found in Sullivan,
Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the
Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 1091, 1098-1101. For a more complex recent examination of the problem, see Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges
in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69 (1982).
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This paradox manifests itself throughout the Bankruptcy Code. Pro-

vided certain requirements are met, the'ordinary Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of all or virtually all his debts in exchange for payments

that are nearly always far smaller than those debts; indeed, unsecured
creditors in liquidation proceedings typically receive nothing at all.2 4 This
is the "discharge" aspect of bankruptcy. On the other hand, if the
debtor has any non-exempt assets, some part of those assets, or of the
debtor's future income, or both are distributed to creditors-the "collection" aspect of bankruptcy. Moreover, since some debts are felt to

be more important than others (or their incurrence more heinous), they
are given special status. One form of special status is "priority" in the
collection aspect, which requires the payment by the trustee of those
debts in preference to others.2" Another is "non-dischargeability," which
has no direct effect on the collection aspect of bankruptcy but limits
the scope of its discharge aspect by refusing to release the debtor from
6

certain obligations.1

Straddling one of the fault lines between these two aspects of bankruptcy are the two types of bankruptcy created by the code-liquidation
bankruptcy and reorganization bankruptcy. Chapter 727 of the Code
exemplifies the former; 28 Chapters 11, 919 and 13,30 the latter. As indicated

above, in the paradigmatic liquidation bankruptcy, the debtor's nonexempt assets are seized by the trustee and sold; the proceeds, if any,
are distributed to creditors. In the paradigmatic reorganization bankruptcy, the debtor retains assets in exchange for an obligation to make
payments out of future income. Historically, liquidation has been the
norm and reorganization the exception; moreover, it has generally been
true that no debtor can be forced to reorganize by his creditors.',

24. See supra note 13. Indeed, the truth of the matter is that Chapter 7 is scarcely
a system of distribution at all:
One who does nothing more than peruse the provisions of the Code, however,
would be blissfully unaware of the economic realities of the typical consumer
proceedings ....
[F]or all practical purposes, the priority and distribution provisions of chapter 7 are virtually a dead letter since, in over 90% of all cases,
there are no assets available for distribution after exemptions are claimed.
Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 335.
25. The major priorities are listed in II U.S.C. § 507 (1982).
26. The major non-dischargeable debts are listed in id. § 523.
27. But note that Chapter 7 proceedings can include a temporary continuation of
the debtor's business so as to provide for an orderly liquidation of the estate. Id. § 721.
28. Liquidations may also be conducted under Chapter I1. Id. § 1123(5)(D).
29. Id. §§ 901-46. Chapter 9 provides for the reorganization of the debts of a
municipality.
30. It should be noted, however, that nothing in Chapter 13 expressly prohibits
liquidation of assets to fund the plan.
31. See generally, Black & Herbert, supra note 3, at 849-50. This principle was always
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The perceived problem with the traditional treatment of reorgani-

zation is that some debtors have a combination of large debts, few
current assets, and the prospect of greatly augmented income. Such

debtors can undergo a cheap liquidation and thereby avoid paying debts
that they could easily manage. 2 The problem of balancing the debtor's
interest in discharge against the creditor's wish to get paid is not a new
one,33 and various Code provisions have long attempted to blunt the
effect of "unnecessary" discharges.14 In the view of some creditors,

followed with less rigor where corporations were concerned, id. at 850 n.22, and was
considerably watered down by the Bankruptcy Code, which permits certain debtors to be
placed involuntarily into Chapter It. I1 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982).
32. The most detailed treatment of this perceived problem was the so-called "Purdue
Study," more formally, Credit Research Center, Krannert School of Management, Purdue
University, Monograph Nos. 23 and 24, Consumer Bankruptcy Study (1982) [hereinafter
Purdue Study] which asserted, among other things, that $1,100,000 of debt was being
"unnecessarily" discharged each year. I Purdue Study at 88-91.
33. Quite colorful Congressional debate on both sides of the discharge vs. collection
issue can be found at least as early as the 1860's:
Of what advantage can it be to creditors or to the country that so many tens
of thousands of the active men of this country should be held in thralldom?
...The law formerly in force by which a creditor could keep his debtor in
prison for an indefinite period, without relief, has been abolished in all Christian
countries. But there may be a punishment of death without the knife, and an
imprisonment without the bolts and bars of the jail.
...What to [the debtors] are the guarantees of the Constitution? Why should
they love the Government and yield it a hearty allegiance?
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2638 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes), and as late
as the 1980's:
Mr. Chairman, for the last couple of years in going home, I have been getting
many complaints from the owners of small businesses about the large number
of persons taking bankruptcy. It was pointed out to me that a number of these
persons taking bankruptcy had good jobs. They could pay their obligations, but
it was the easier route to go chapter 7 and take bankruptcy and not worry
about their debts.
Well, something is wrong when the bankruptcy laws encourage people to take
bankruptcy and then a small businessman goes before the courts and they tell
him, "We can't help you at all."
130 Cong. Rec. H1812 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (remarks of Rep. G. V. Montgomery).
34. To mention only a few examples: (1) Property received by the debtor within 180
days after the filing of the petition becomes part of the estate if it was received through
bequest, devise, inheritance, as part of a property settlement with a spouse or as the
beneficiary of life insurance. (II U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1986); see also Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(7), I1 U.S.C. § I10(a)(7) (1976) (repealed 1979)); (2) fraudulent transfers
of property are avoidable (11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. 1986); see also Bankruptcy
Act § 67(d), II U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976) (repealed 1979)); (3) most debtors eligible for
Chapter II proceedings may be forced to reorganize (11 U:S.C. § 303(a) (1982); but see
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however, the problem of the high-rolling debtor became much more
acute with the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act" and the simultaneous erosion of social and moral inhibitions associated with de6
claring bankruptcy.
Although many criticisms were leveled at the consumer bankruptcy
provisions of the original Bankruptcy Code, two predominated. First,
it was "too easy" to file for liquidation under Chapter 7; too many
people who "could pay" were liquidating just to "shuck a couple of
...debts." 3' 7 Second, the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which actually tried
to encourage consumers to reorganize under Chapter 13 rather than
liquidate under Chapter 7 by making reorganization more attractive, 8
had made reorganization too cheap. On its face, Chapter 13 only obligated the debtor to pay what would have been paid in liquidation, 9
and gave creditors no vehicle to require payments in excess of that
amount.40 One response to these problems was a recommendation by
the credit industry that, to obtain a discharge, all consumer debtors
who had disposable income be required to pay their creditors all of
their income in excess of a somewhat adjusted version of the federal
4
poverty level for a period of several years .
Although the validity of the data on which that proposal was based
was derided, 42 and the feasibility and fairness of so-called bankruptcy

Herbert, supra note 10, at 234, 248-251 (consumers should be permitted to file voluntary
Chapter II proceedings because not prohibited by Code but should not be subject to
involuntary Chapter II proceedings)). Each of these provisions gives creditors access to
those non-current assets of the debtor that the debtor is presumed not to need for
economic survival.
35. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (which enacted, among other things,
the Bankruptcy Code).
36. See generally, Black & Herbert, supra note 3, at 850-51; Breitowitz, supra note
3, at 327-41.
37. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
38. With regard to the structure and goals of the original version of Chapter 13
under the Code, see generally, Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment to and Classification of Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20
Washburn L.J. i (1980).
39. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
40. See generally, Black & Herbert, supra note 3, at 847-48.
41. I Purdue Study, supra note 32, at 98-100. The income debtors would have been
permitted to retain was adjusted for several, primarily geographical, factors from the
federal poverty line. Id. at 42-56.
42. The most extensive critiques of the Purdue Study are Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 23, and a follow-up study by the same authors, Rejoinder: Limiting
Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1087. A number of other reports
include data that contradict key aspects of the Purdue Study, including the GAO Report,
supra note 13; Schuchman & Roper, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings
and Other Purposes, 56 Am. Bankr. L.J. I (1982); Schuchman, The Average Bankruptcy:
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poverty vigorously contested,,

strenuously urged in Congress."

variations of the basic proposal were

In the end, the concepts of forced

reorganization and mandatory payment standards were largely rejected.
Two vestiges remain. The first is the requirement, noted above, that
the Chapter 13 debtor pay his disposable income to his creditors under
some circumstances. The second is set out in Section 707(b)4 5 of the
Code, which now permits the bankruptcy court, sua sponte, to dismiss
consumer liquidation proceedings that are a "substantial abuse" of
Chapter 7 of the Code.
B.

BAFJA and its Legislative History

The Consumer Credit Amendments of BAFJA and the legislative
history accompanying those amendments are remarkable for their extreme
reticence. 46 Congress felt neither the duty nor the desire to define the
key provisions of those amendments in any useful way. "Disposable
income" is no exception. We are told only that disposable income is

A Description and Analysis of 753 Personal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 88 Com.
L.J. 288 (1983); and Woodward & Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 88 Com. L.J. 309 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective,
30 UCLA L. Rev. 327, 352-55 (1982); LoPucki, "Encouraging" Repayment Under Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 Harv. J. on Legis. 347, 369-72 (1981); Sullivan, Warren
& Westbrook, supra note 23, at 1138-44; and Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note
42, at 1098-1101.
44. See generally, Ginsberg, The Proposed Bankruptcy Improvement Act: The Creditors Strike Back, 1982 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. I and Ginsberg, The Bankruptcy Improvements
Act-An Update, 1983 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 235.
45. The section reads in full:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the request
or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds
that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of
this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested
by the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1986).
46. In the apt words of one commentator:
The legislative history of the bill [BAFJA] as finally enacted is sparse. The socalled Conference Report contains nothing more than the text of the corrected
bill that ultimately became law. The few remarks in the Congressional Record
focus almost entirely on the restructuring of the court system, expressing dissatisfaction over the failure to establish an Article Ill judiciary and vesting the
appointment of judges in courts of appeals, rather than in the President.
Breitowitz, supra note 3, at 336. Breitowitz goes on to note that there is a somewhat
more substantial legislative history for some of the bankruptcy reform bills that were not
passed. Id. The extent to which that legislative history should be relevant (given the
refusal of Congress to enact the legislation upon which it commented) is a complex
problem in its own right, unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.
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income "not reasonably necessary to be expended ... for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor ' 47 and,
if the debtor is in business, "not reasonably necessary to be expended
... for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation,
preservation, and operation of such business."48
A number of other Code provisions require similar income measuring
determinations by the courts. The cases decided under these provisions
may provide at least some precedential comfort for courts interpreting
disposable income. It should be noted, however, that there is practically
no legislative history regarding many of those provisions either; and, as
will be discussed, only one group of parallel provisions creates a standard
that is clearly identical to disposable income.
Several of the so-called "federal" exemptions 49 are limited to the
amount "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor." 50 These provisions articulate exactly the same
standard used in Section 1325(b), and the courts should have no difficulty
in applying cases decided under these exemptions to those under the
disposable income standard. The exemption cases can obviously provide

47. Ii U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1986).
48. Id. § 1325(b)(2)(B).
49. II U.S.C. § 522(b)(1),(d) (1982 & Supp. 1986). So-called because they are created
by federal, rather than state, law.
50. These are:
The debtor's right to receive ...alimony, support, or separate maintenance,
to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor.
Id § 522(d)(10)(D);
The debtor's right to receive ...a payment under a stock bonus, pension,
profitsharing, annuity or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability,
death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor ....
Id. § 522(d)(10)(E);
The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to ... a payment
on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the debtor was a
dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
any dependent of the debtor.
Id. § 522(d)(ll)(B);
The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to ...a payment
under a life insurance contract that insured the life of an individual of whom
the debtor was a dependent on the date of such individual's death, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor.
Id. § 522(d)(II)(C); and
The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to ...a payment
in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an individual of
whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
Id.. § 522(d)(1l)(E).
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useful support for measuring a consumer's disposable income, but not
that of a proprietor whose disposable income calculation also requires
a determination of reasonably necessary business expenses.',
Similarly, Section 523(a)(8) makes certain student loan debts nondischargeable unless excepting the debts from discharge would impose
"undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents. '"5'2 The

courts should also look to this rule as a source of interpretive decisions."
The utility of Section 523(a)(8) may be more limited than that of the
exemption provisions, because "undue hardship" could obviously be

interpreted as imposing a greater or lesser standard than disposable
income."4

51.

See supra note 20.

52. The section reads, in pertinent part:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt .. .for an educational loan made, insured,
or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in

whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution, unless(A) such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of any
applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.
I!U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (West Supp. 1986).
53.

With some caution, however, since it appears that no court has considered the

possibly significant difference in wording between the "debtor or dependents" formula
used in §§ 522 and 1325 and "debtor and dependents" formula used in § 523. With
regard to undue hardship generally, see Kosel, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue Hardship"-The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy, II Golden Gate L. Rev. 457
(1981).
54. Some indication of the meaning of undue hardship can be gleaned from the
Report of the Bankruptcy Commission that ultimately led to the enactment of the Code:
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will impose an
"undue hardship" on the debtor, the rate and amount of his future resources
should be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to obtain, retain, and continue
employment and the rate of pay that can be expected. Any unearned income
or other wealth which the debtor can be expected to receive should also be
taken into account. The total amount of income, its reliability, and the periodicity
of its receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor and his dependents,
at a minimal standard of living within their management capability, as well as
to pay the educational debt.
2 Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-137, 93d Cong., istSess. 140-41 n.17 (1973).
The great majority of bankruptcy courts have followed the analytical schemes provided
in Andrews v. South Dakota Student Loan Assistance Corp., 661 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1981)
and Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979), to determine when undue hardship is present and a discharge
of student loans is proper.
Johnson, decided prior to the effective date of the Code under the cognate provision
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There are also a number of valuable pre-BAFJA cases under the
"good faith" requirement of Section 1325(a)(3)." As noted above, a
number of courts sought to avoid Chapter 13 "abuse" by interpreting
good faith to require the best efforts, or at least a substantial effort,
of the debtor to pay his creditors. While it is not clear that the good
faith-best efforts standard is identical to the disposable income standard,
they are .certainly aimed at the same perceived abuse and thus may be
6
substantively indistinguishable.1
A new provision of the Code that provided some rhetorical comfort
to the credit industry may also provide some help to consumer lawyers.
One of the new provisions added by BAFJA creates a presumption that
certain debts incurred in the acquisition of "luxury goods or services''"
are nondischargeable. 8 Since "luxury goods or services" are negatively

of prior law (20 U.S.C. §§ 1087-93 (1976) (repealed 1978)) set out an elaborate threepart test which, in greatly simplified form, looks to three consecutive questions: (1) Could
the debtor, during the period of the loan, both pay the loan and maintain himself and
his dependents at a subsistence standard of living? (2) If so, has the debtor been negligent
or irresponsible in his efforts to minimize expenses, maximize resources, or secure employment, and did this affect his ability to simultaneously pay the loan and maintain a
subsistence standard of living? (3) If so, did the amount of the student loan, and the
percentage of the debtor's total indebtedness represented by the student loan indicate that
the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy was to discharge the student debt or that the
debtor had definitely benefited financially from the education the loan helped to finance?
5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) at 536-45.
It is unfortunate that Congress does not seem to have realized that all of these incomebased provisions are interlocking. All relate to the creditors' ability to reach the debtor's
future income against the will of the debtor and without any chance for the debtor to
bargain over the amount of his income that will go to creditors. It would have been
most helpful if a logically coherent and linguistically consistent basis for granting involuntary access to future income had been set out in the Code.
55. That section states, in pertinent part: "Except as provided in subsection (b), the
court shall confirm a plan if . . . the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by
any means forbidden by law." II U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(3) (1982).
56. Unless, of course, a debtor's best efforts are still required, or if the good faith
standard otherwise obligates the debtor to provide more money to the plan than § 1325(b)
requires. See infra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
57. The quotation marks appear in the Code.
58. The section reads, in pertinent part:
A discharge under section 727, 1141 or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt(2) for money, property,
financing of credit, to the
(A) false pretenses, a
other than a statement
financial condition;
(C)

services, or an extension, renewal, or reextent obtained byfalse representation, or actual fraud,
respecting the debtor's or an insider's

for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,
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defined as those that are not "reasonably acquired for the support or
maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, ' 59 the terminology appears analogous to disposable income. Again, however, Congress has provided language susceptible of dissimilar interpretations without
indicating how the potential distinction is to be properly drawn. Can
something be "reasonably acquired" but not be "reasonably necessary"?
Finally, Section 707(b), under which a case can be dismissed for
"substantial abuse" of the liquidation and discharge system of Chapter
7,60 has occasionally been seen as parallel to Section 1325(b). Great
caution must be used in comparing the two, however. It is quite clear
that Section 707(b) should require something more than the presence of
disposable income to permit dismissal of a bankruptcy case.
Although the legislative history of Section 707(b) is sparse, what
little exists is as unequivocal as any in the Bankruptcy Code. Section
707(b) dismissal, if based on the amount distributed to creditors, is
appropriate only if the amount the debtor could comfortably pay is
greatly disproportionate to the amount the creditors will receive in
liquidation. 61 Some cases suggest that, even if substantial payments could

consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating
more than $500 for "luxury goods or services" incurred by
an individual debtor on or within forty days before the order
for relief under this title ... are presumed to be nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services" do not include goods
or services reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor ....
II U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Reasonably comprehensive catalogues of the
problems created by this oddly worded and ill-considered provision can be found in Black
& Herbert, supra note 3, at 870-74 and Morris, supra note 3, at 128-32.
59. Ii U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986).
60. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
61. § 202(c) of the unenacted Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983 was
identical to § 707(b). With regard to that provision, the Senate Report on the Omnibus
Bankruptcy Improvements Act stated:
This provision represents a balancing of two interests. It preserves the fundamental concept embodied in our bankruptcy laws that debtors who cannot
meet debts as they come due should be able to relinquish non-exempt property
in exchange for a fresh start. At the same time, however, it upholds creditors'
interests in obtaining repayment where such repayment would not be a burden.
Crushing debt burdens and severe financial problems place enormous strains
on borrowers and their families. Family life, personal emotional health, or work
productivity often suffers. By enabling individuals who cannot meet their debts
to start a new life, unburdened with debts they cannot pay, the bankruptcy
laws allow troubled borrowers to become productive members of their communities. Nothing in this bill denies such borrowers with unaffordable debt
burdens bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. However, if a debtor can meet his
debts without difficulty as they come due, use of Chapter 7 would represent a
substantial abuse. S. Rep. No. 65, 98th Cong., IstSess. 53-54 (1983) (emphasis
added).
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be made, there is no "substantial abuse" of bankruptcy if the debtor
has made an economically justifiable decision and has acted in a forthright manner with his creditors. 6 2 In any event, the reduction of "substantial abuse" to the equivalent of "disposable income" would ignore
Congress' decision not to make Chapter 13 mandatory for the typical
consumer debtor. 6 By and large, the cases seem to have recognized this
distinction.
Thus, Section 707(b) should not be viewed as an analogue of Section
1325(b), but as describing one end of a spectrum on which Section
1325(b) lies roughly in the middle. Some debtors have little or no income
beyond that needed to pay minimal living expenses. They cannot reorganize because they have no income available to be contributed to a
plan.64 Some debtors can reorganize, and if they choose to do so may
be required to pay all their disposable income as the price of reorganization. Still others must reorganize because there is no reason we
consider valid for them not to pay their debts.6 1 What can safely be
said is that expenditures that evidence substantial abuse of the bankruptcy
laws are by definition among those expenditures that are not reasonably
necessary for the debtor or the debtor's dependents. In short, what
Section 707(b) prohibits, Section 1325(b) prohibits; but what Section
1325(b) prohibits, Section 707(b) may allow.
Within the limitations indicated, this article does incorporate some
unsystematic discussion of disposable income related cases, especially
those decided since the disposable income standard was imposed. Nevertheless, these cases are used merely to strengthen discussion of partic-

62. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
63. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text; see also Breitowitz, supra note 3,
at 66-67:
ITjhe underlying assumption of (§ 707(b)] as well as of its predecessors is that
dismissal of the chapter [sic] 7 will result in substantial returns to creditors by
their realizing on the debtor's future income. This ignores the basic psychological
fact that if all of the debtor's disposable income must be applied to the repayment
of debts, the amount of that disposable income islikely to diminish. As Professor
Vern Countryman noted:
Voluntary composition and extension agreements have been successfully employed
....

but an involuntary composition or extension agreement forced upon a

debtor seeking relief under Chapter 7 can be expected to work about as well
as compulsory marriage counselling for a spouse bent on a separation or divorce
....

A debtor who is forced into Chapter 13 would not reasonably be expected

to have the same incentive or to make the same effort to produce the earnings
necessary successfully to perform the plan ....

[quoting S. Rep. No. 446, 97th

Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1982)).
64. I1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1982) requires, as a condition of confirmation, that "the
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan ......
65. Or more precisely, such debtors can choose to reorganize or not to file bankruptcy
at all.
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ularly important points as to which there are no cases yet under Section
1325(b), or to provide additional illustrations where case law does exist.
No attempt is made to study comprehensively any payment standard
other than disposable income.
C.

The Cases
1.

In General

In measuring disposable income and its kindred provisions, the courts
can be neatly if simplistically divided into two groups-discharge oriented
and collection oriented. The primary concern of the former group is
the debtor's fresh start; it is more sensitive to the burdens of bankruptcy.
The latter is more concerned with abuses, present or potential, and is
more censorious of those whose financial habits have created problems
for their creditors as well as themselves. The distinction between the
two groups is not perhaps as great as their labels at first suggest. Both
attempt to balance the unreconcilable-the desire of the creditor to
extract payment from what the debtor claims to be a dry hole. Indeed,
there are few if any radical differences in the total dollars that debtors
are required to pay by courts in the two camps, although there are
significant variations at the margin. The differences are more sharply
drawn in the courts' rhetoric, a sample of which is given below:
From the discharge side:
[Chapter 13] was not intended to take the last so[u]. A cushion
of money is necessary in Chapter 13 budgeting to guard against
life's unexpectancies. It is not in the public interest to squeeze
the last dollar from Chapter 13 debtors to fund a Chapter 13
plan.66
Collection's reply:
[T]his case was brought, not because of the Debtor's unemployment or an inability to pay on his part, but because he
simply desired to shuck a couple of his debts.

• . . While Congress intended to give the Debtors relief in such
cases, it was not the design of the Bankruptcy laws to allow

66. In re Otero, 48 Bankr. 704, 708 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 1985). More controversially,
the Otero court went on to hold that imposition of the disposable income standard is
discretionary with the court. Id. at 708. To date, this position has not been adopted by
any other court.
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the Debtor to67lead the life of Riley while his creditors suffer
on his behalf.
Still other courts have stressed the compromise nature of BAFJA's
restrictions on consumer bankruptcy. "Code § 707(b) is an attempt to
adjust the balance between the ease of discharge and respect for the
sanctity of contract ....-"6 "[Tihe purpose of chapter 13 is to provide
the maximum recovery to creditors while at the same time leaving the
69
debtor sufficient money to pay for his or her basic living expenses."
None of these general principles adds much to the initial definition.
2.

General Definition of Income

Since disposable income is defined negatively-as the excess of income over reasonably necessary expenses-the first step is to determine
what constitutes income. Several problems have arisen. First, how does
one determine the amount of future income? Second, does the debtor's
income include sources other than the debtor's income from earnings
and investment? Third, to what extent must changes in the debtor's
income be reflected in the plan? Finally, should disposable assets be
counted in determining disposable income?
The first problem is perfectly familiar to a profession that attempts
to project, e.g., lost future income in a wrongful death case. To date,
however, the disposable income cases have been rather less than scientific
in estimating future income. The one case explicitly dealing with this
matter, In re Foster,70 provides very little guidance.
The Fosters were farmers; their income was thus variable and uncertain. 7 The court made no significant effort to estimate what that
income might be; it merely noted that "[tihe projected disposable income
of a family like the Fosters can not be estimated with the degree of
certainty it could be for a family with a fixed income." 2 The court

67. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21, 24, 26 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1984) (discussing § 707(b)).
See also, In re Campbell, 63 Bankr. 702, 705 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (§ 707(b) case):
[Tlhis writer has been appalled at the number of cases where the disposable
income (for 36 months) shown on the filed schedules exceeded the total indebtedness .... Such cases cause (hopefully well founded) queries in this Judge's
mind as to the moral fiber of some debtors and the ethical standards of some
counsel.
68. In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 938 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
69. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
70. 61 Bankr. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
71. Id.at 494.
72. Id.
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went on to suggest that any reasonable guesstimate of future income
and expenses would be acceptable. 73
The meager case law on the second question has appropriately read
"income" quite broadly. It includes any income of any kind that is
not exempt from seizure in bankruptcy. 74 Less obviously but perhaps
more significantly, the calculation of disposable income may include
income other than the debtor's.
The reasonably necessary expenses that are deducted from income
are those relating to support of the debtor or the debtor's dependents.75
Obviously, some debtors are themselves dependents (or at least share
living expenses with others), and many debtors have dependents who
are also dependents of other persons. In other words, many debtors
have the benefit of someone else's income. At least one disposable
income case has held that the income of a non-debtor spouse must be
taken into account in determining the debtor spouse's disposable income,
precisely because the debtor spouse has the benefit of that income and
thus not all of his income is reasonably necessary for support of himself
76
or his dependents.
The treatment of these issues is not controversial. A difficult problem
would arise, however, if a debtor enjoyed the benefit of income that
was less assured than that of a spouse. 77 Support to an adult debtor
from a parent or rich aunt might well cease, especially if all of that
support would be used to pay creditors rather than to improve the
debtor's style of life. The debtor might also be the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust. Can the debtor exploit the uncertainty of income from
the trust to prevent inclusion of any income from it in the disposable
income calculation? How should the court respond if the plan is confirmed on the assumption that the debtor will receive nothing from the
trust, yet two weeks later, the trustees suddenly distribute $100,000 to
the debtor?

73. This may be gleaned from the court's willingness to believe that Mr. Foster would
be able to work 76-78 hours per week, and that the debtor's planned expenses, which
the court found "very conservative" and even "not realistic," did not disqualify the plan
from confirmation. Id. The plan, however, was denied confirmation on other grounds.
Id. at 494-495.
74. In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (income tax refund).
75. See supra note 20.
76. In re Saunders, 60 Bankr. 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); cf. In re Shands, 63
Bankr. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1985) (§ 707(b) case). Saunders relied on several goodfaith cases: In re Kern, 40 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Sellers, 33 Bankr.
854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) and In re Kull, 12 Bankr. 654 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
77. The court in Kern skirted this issue. Kern argued that his wife's income'should
not be taken into account because she would divorce him if he required her to contribute
to her own support. The court brushed this argument aside as "simply untenable," because
"to do so would mean forcing Mr. Kern's creditors to subsidize part of her living
expenses." 40 Bankr. at 29.
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That problem is of course part of a larger difficulty directly related
to the problem of projecting income. The debtor's income will almost
certainly change during the course of the three year period. To what
extent can and should the court permit or require adjustment of the
debtor's payments?
If read literally, Section 1325(b)(l)(B) would not permit adjustment.
The income that must be paid to creditors is "the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the three-year period beginning on
the date that the first payment is due under the plan."' 8 If the amount
paid is increased or decreased after the beginning of the period, it no
longer reflects the debtor's projected income for that period but rather
his actual income.
Such a literal reading would impose an unusual rigidity on Chapter
13 proceedings. Congress made it almost as easy to modify a Chapter
13 plan as to propose one.7 9 The apparent reason was that Congress
wanted Chapter 13 debtors to be able to make justifiable changes in
unsuccessful but salvageable plans; if such changes were prohibited, such
plans would be abandoned entirely and liquidation would follow.
It should be obvious that a miscalculation of disposable income is
the most serious risk to a Chapter 13 plan. " A debtor who estimates
his disposable income at $30,000 and proposes to pay creditors accordingly will not be able to do so if his disposable income proves to be
only $10,000.1' If the plan cannot be modified to reduce the payments,

78. II U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
79. The relevant provision states, in pertinent part:
At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of payments
under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor, the
trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to(I) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments;
or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is
provided for by the plan, to the extent necessary to take account of
any payment of such claim other than under the plan.
II U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The prerequisites for confirmation of a
modification are essentially identical to those for confirmation of the original plan. Id.
§ 1329(b); e.g., there is no requirement of approval by unsecured creditors. Moreover,
the modified plan becomes the plan unless disapproved. Id. § 1329(b)(2).
80. Indeed, it may be almost the only risk other than the debtor's change of heart.
What little data exists suggests that Chapter 13 plans fail for the obvious reasonsrecognition of the difficulty of funding the plan, illness, layoff, or reduced income. Girth,
supra note 12, at 59-60.
81. Or, more precisely, he will not be able to do so without the sale of the assets
he hoped to preserve or devastating results to himself or his dependents.
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the debtor will have to convert to Chapter 7.82 The availability of
modification also reduces the need to guess precisely the debtor's future

income and expenses, and thus greatly simplifies the initial process of
determining disposable income.
Prior to 1984 it was probably true that only the debtor could propose

a modification of the plan.8" However, since BAFJA the trustee and
any holder of an unsecured claim have been able to do likewise. 84 There
is nothing in the Code that supports any distinction between the mod-

ification rights of the debtor (who will of course seek to reduce payments
when income falls) and those of the trustee and the creditors (who may
similarly seek to increase payments when income rises).85 It is thus

reasonably certain that a modification increasing or decreasing plan

6
payments to correspond with changes in income is permissible.1
A more subtle question is the extent to which the plan itself can

or must provide in advance for possible future changes in the debtor's
income. The court in In re Akin 87 refused to confirm a plan because
there was "no statement in the plan that as the debtor's disposable
income increases it will automatically be applied to the plan." '88 In re
Kruit 9 imposed a somewhat less demanding requirement. Noting that
the debtor was likely to experience a rise in future income, it required

the debtor to provide for payment to creditors of 50% of any increase
in his income during the plan period. 90
It is certainly difficult to justify either approach under the language

of Section 1325(b), since both require payment plans that are clearly
82. Which the debtor may do unilaterally at any time during the pendency of the
proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1982).
83. In re Boone, 53 Bankr. 78 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); contra, In re Koonce, 54
Bankr. 643 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1985).
84. II U.S.C. § 1329(a) (West Supp. 1986).
85. It is unlikely, however, that this right will be exercised very often. First, there
is no normal vehicle for monitoring changes in the debtor's financial status. Second, the
cost of monitoring the debtor will rarely be seen by creditors to be justified, given the
small size of the typical Chapter 13 proceeding. Cf. Girth, supra note 12, at 60-63.
It should be noted, however, that, by giving these modification rights to the trustee
and the creditors, Congress has watered down two Chapter 13 principles-voluntariness
and simplicity. Since someone other than the debtor can now force the plan to be modified,
the debtor is not solely in control of his reorganization. And the possibility of creditor
modification may, in some large Chapter 13 cases, induce creditor monitoring and reintroduce (albeit on an informal basis) some of the negotiating process that was eliminated
by the Code. See Herbert, supra note 9, at 635-36.
86. See In re Koonce, 54 Bankr. 643 (Bankr. D. S. C. 1985) (case filed prior to
BAFJA). Koonce reads like a very bad law school hypothetical; after the debtor's Chapter
13 plan was confirmed he won $1,300,000 in the Massachusetts State Lottery.
87. 54 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
88. Id.at 703.
89. 54 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
90. Id.at 377-78.
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different from the provision of "projected" disposable income to creditors. Nevertheless, if modifications of disposable income are permissible
during the plan period, it is hard to identify any per se reason why the
plan itself could not call for automatic modification as disposable income
fluctuates. 9' Arguably, the only difference is the advantage of avoiding
the additional costs associated with piecemeal modification.
There are other problems, however. The Akin approach may be
administratively unworkable. Who will monitor the debtor to determine
his disposable income? This is a serious problem, because both income
and reasonably necessary expenses will vary from time to time. Can the
debtor unilaterally reduce payments whenever he believes his disposable
income has dropped? If so, the Akin rule would make Chapter 13's
modification provisions almost a nullity insofar as the debtor is concerned, since it would permit the debtor to change his payment level
at will without going through the required (if admittedly simple) modification procedures.
The monitoring problem in Krull might be simpler, since only the
amount of the debtor's gross income needs to be watched. Krull, however, imposed a payment standard that is radically different from that
set out in Section 1325(b). The plan required the debtor to pay neither
his projected disposable income nor his actual disposable income, but
his projected disposable income plus 50% of the amount by which his
actual disposable income exceeded his projected disposable income. 92 The
court arrived at this calculation by superimposing the "good faith"
standard on the disposable income standard, a matter which will be
discussed below.
The final problem with the general definition of income has not
yet arisen in any reported case. If the debtor has assets which he can
sell to meet living expenses, does that mean that the amount of his
income needed for living expenses is correspondingly reduced? The answer to this question should be no, because it would frustrate one of
the key purposes of Chapter 13, that is, to permit the debtor to retain
assets in exchange for future income. The requirement that the debtor
provide creditors with at least the value of his assets means that the
debtor will have to "pay" for any assets retained anyway; and to force
the debtor to "pay" for those assets and then dispose of them would
effectively impose a double discharge cost on the debtor.

91. It should be noted that the logic of Akin is that, as both the debtor's income
and the debtor's reasonably necessary expenses change, the amount payable to creditors
should change.
92. Krull, 54 Bankr. at 378.
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Discretionary Decreases in Income

To date, no court has had to deal directly with one potential
problem: a debtor who deliberately reduces his income during the plan
period. One of the policy concerns in the area of individual reorganization is the debtor's difficulty in maintaining the incentive to work if
the fruits of his labor merely garnish the creditor's table. If all of a
debtor's income above a very low level of expenditure is devoted to
paying debts, why should the debtor bother to earn that extra money?
'Professionals especially have the opportunity to manipulate their incomes.
A doctor, for example, might choose to spend his plan period working
in Harlem for a fraction of the salary he could earn in Scarsdale.
At least one disposable income case and a few other cases in related
areas have indicated that the debtor's ability to earn, rather than his
actual income, is crucial to determining the amount the creditors should
receive. 93 If indeed that is the case, and if this principle were carried
to its logical extreme, the debtor would be forced to earn as much as
he possibly could. This would be, to say the least, an awkward rule to
enforce.94 If, however, the debtor has unfettered power to choose how
much he will earn, the disposable income standard could be eviscerated.
The problem may be largely a chimera, for at least two reasons.
First, even if the debtor pays everything he earns above his bare living
expenses to creditors, the debtor, especially if he is a professional, may
still obtain significant benefits from continuing his ordinary work. The
greater experience and knowledge which the debtor will have at the end
of the plan period is a marketable asset which, because it has not yet
been converted into income, is retained by the debtor. Second, the
courts' treatment of the disposable income standard virtually ensures
that the debtor will be able to enjoy, during the plan period, a lifestyle
roughly commensurate with his income. The simple truth is that the
courts have not required high-income debtors to live as if they were
earning minimum wage; they have only been obligated to live as if they

93. See, e.g., In re Kazzaz, 62 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (debtor's inability
to read or write English relevant in determining disposable income); In re Sanabria, 52
Bankr. 75 (N. D. Ill. 1985) (fact that debtor was a newly graduated medical doctor and
thus would likely experience increased income relevant to whether Chapter 13 plan was
filed in good faith). See also, In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (potential
income of former college president relevant in determining whether Chapter 7 petition
was a substantial abuse under § 707(b)) and In re Springer, 54 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1985) (potential future income due to Harvard graduate degree relevant in determining
whether student loans were dischargeable under undue hardship standard of § 523(a)(8)).
94. One example of this, perhaps only slightly tongue-in-cheek, asks whether, if such
a standard were adopted and the debtor were a football player, "the bankruptcy judge,
sweatshirted and bewhistled, [would] decide if [the debtor] was 'dogging it."' Sullivan,
Warren & Westbrook, supra note 23, at 1136 n.283.
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were moderately frugal recipients of their level of income.95 While the
fairness of this interpretation may be subject to debate, it is unlikely
that the courts will or, given the background of the present statutory
structure, should change it.96
The courts should, however, be conscious of the risk of reduced
incentive to earn when evaluating disposable income; if allowable expenses are pared so low that the debtor sees no point in making any
money, the goal of making Chapter 13 an alternative to Chapter 7 that
is attractive to debtors and profitable to creditors will be frustrated.
There may also be occasional cases in which the court must make very
difficult decisions about the debtor's willingness to cooperate with the
plan. The doctor who announces he is heading to Harlem for the
duration, seeing in his forced income reduction the opportunity to fulfill
an apparently sincere religious or ethical duty, would present the court
with a hard choice between the interests of the creditors and the interests
of those whom the doctor proposes to serve.
4.

Savings and Contingency Reserves

The division between the different philosophies regarding disposable
income becomes clearly visible when the debtor seeks to continue any
form of savings plan or reserves any of his income for contingencies.
Some courts have permitted significant amounts to be held back "for
a rainy day." Others have refused to allow the debtor to retain quite
picayune sums.
The extremes are set out neatly in two cases, In re Otero97 and In
re Red. 98 In Otero, the debtor was permitted to retain $117 per month
as a "cushion ... against life's unexpectancies." 9 9 In Red, the debtor
was denied permission to continue a $12.50 per week payroll transfer
to her credit union savings account.100 Other cases are about equally
divided.""

95. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
96. It should be obvious that this problem would have become much more acute if
the Purdue Study recommendation that all debtors be forced to live at the adjusted poverty
line had been accepted by Congress.
97. 48 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
98. 60 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
99. 48 Bankr. at 708.
100. 60 Bankr. at 116.
101. See, e.g., In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) ($75 per month
contingency reserve a "reasonably necessary" expense); In re Festner, 54 Bankr. 532
(Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1985) ($47 per month for retirement plan and stock purchase plan
part of disposable income); see also In re Ali, 33 Bankr. 890 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)
(plan that permitted debtor to retain $19 per month of his disposable income in good
faith), and In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (one reason for holding
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The real issue is whether the money saved is likely to be needed
by the debtor during the three year period or not. Obviously, a debtor
should not be allowed to save for retirement, or even a mardi gras
ending to his penitential three years. If the debtor can afford to shift
current income to the post-plan period, that income was self-evidently
not necessary for the support of the debtor or his dependents during
the plan period. 0 Yet it is equally obvious that personal expenses do
not arrive in tidy monthly lumps. The debtor should be allowed to
retain during one part of the plan period those assets that may reasonably
be needed by the debtor for necessary expenses during another part. If
this were not permitted, the chance for successful completion of the
plan would be sharply reduced. Moreover, to the extent that the court
is concerned about the retention of excessive contingency reserves, it
could require the debtor to account for any unspent and uncommitted
reserves at the end of the plan, and to make a final dividend to creditors
of whatever excess remained.
The principle that income can be shifted within but not beyond the
plan period is implicitly recognized in a number of the disposable income
cases. Many permissible periodic expenditures, such as clothing purchases, insurance premiums and medical bills, are presented in the schedule of expenses as if they were monthly payments. 03 In fact, such
schedules could just as easily and much more accurately describe such
"payments" as "savings reserve for insurance policy.""' 4 This in turn
suggests that small savings plans, such as that in Red, would be permitted
if appropriately relabeled.
5.Lifestyle Expenses
Since the paradigmatic bankruptcy abuser is the free-spending swinger
who finances his sybaritic lifestyle at the expense of his creditors, it is

that Chapter 7 proceeding was a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy Code was that the
debtor's schedules of income and expenses reflected investment of $820 per month in an
annuity).
102. Assuming, of course, that the debtor did not habitually deprive himself or his
dependents of necessities for the purpose of saving money.
103. See. e.g., In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (automobile
insurance, clothing); In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (automobile
insurance, clothing); In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (medical expenses,
automobile insurance, health insurance, household insurance, real estate taxes, clothing);
see also, In re Ali, 33 Bankr. 890 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (medical expenses, automobile
insurance, health insurance, clothing) (good faith standard).
104. There seem to be no disposable income cases that directly discuss the potential
"savings" aspects of life insurance. Logically, the debtor should not be permitted to shift
disposable income from the plan period to the post plan period by using plan period
disposable income to increase the cash value of a life insurance policy; conversely, the
debtor should be able to purchase a reasonable amount of term insurance to protect his
dependents.
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not surprising that the courts have examined the debtor's discretionary
expenses with a close and often jaundiced eye. One of the earliest, and
most cited, cases touching upon this issue is In re Taff.05 That case
concerned the Section 522(d)(10)(E) exemption for certain benefit payments made to the debtor "to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor." ' '6 Taff held
that this standard was based on the amount that "ought to be sufficient
to sustain basic needs" and was "not related to [the debtor's]7 former
status in society or the lifestyle to which he is accustomed."
The rhetoric of Taff has been strongly echoed in a number of
disposable income cases. Courts have found objectionable the payment
of private college tuition;"" private secondary school tuition;"'' monthly
food budgets of $515,""1 $500,' and $480;1I2 monthly telephone expenses
of $300;1" and monthly transportation expenses of $608'" relating to
the debtor's operation of a car that the court viewed as a "luxury
automobile.'"'5
On the other hand, the courts have rather freely permitted the
debtor's budget to include modest expenses for recreational activities.
In re Tinneberg" 6 characterized a creditor's objection to the debtors'
inclusion in their budget of $12 per month for newspapers and periodicals
as "not only spurious [but] downright heartless."' 7 Section 707(b) cases
have been even more generous. In re Bell,"" which found the debtor's
Chapter 7 filing to be abusive, apparently saw nothing wrong with the
debtor expending $100 per month for racquetball and movies." 9 In re

105. 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
106. See supra note 50.
107. 10 Bankr. at 107.
108. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 466-67 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). See also, In re Jolly,
13 Bankr. 123, 125 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (money saved for children's education properly
available to creditors) (good faith standard).
109. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. at 466-67.
110. Id. at 467 (family of four).
I11. In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (§ 707(b) case) (family
of four).
112. In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 642 (Binkr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (§ 707(b) case) (single
individual).
113. In re Kress, 57 Bankr. at 876 (§ 707(b) case) (three telephone lines plus payment
to wife to serve "as a sort of live-in answering service").
114. In re Bell, 56 Bankr. at 642 (§ 707(b) case).
115. Id. The luxury car in question turned out to be a 1984 Audi. Id. at 639.
116. 59 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
117. Id. at 635. Indeed, the court went on to encourage the debtors to submit a less
austere budget to "increase the likelihood of the success of their plan." Id at 635 n.I.
118. 56 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
119. Id. at 639-42 (§ 707(b) case). See also In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 940 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (§ 707(b) case) (inclusion of $100 per month for recreation for family
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Kress seems to have found a $200 per month recreation budget excessive,' 21' but even that might have been allowed but for the debtor's
penchant for flagrantly puffing up every item on his list of expenses.','
The courts have thus generally followed an unobjectionably commonsensical approach to lifestyle expenses, neither requiring asceticism
nor condoning hedonism. Four problems have not yet been significantly
explored. The first is the cost of reducing lifestyle expenses. The second
is the treatment of discretionary increases in expenses. The third is the
impact on the debtor's dependents. The fourth is the impact that the
Taff approach may have on the high rollers whom we presumably want
to coax into Chapter 13. These are discussed in order.
One disposable income case has held that the debtor's monthly $989
mortgage payment was "well above the amount necessary to provide
adequate housing for a family of four." 22 This decision is questionable
on at least two grounds. First, the payment is not abnormal in the
current housing market.' 23 Of course, it is possible to find cheaper
housing, and if the Taff rationale is followed to its extreme conclusion,
the debtor should be obligated to find the cheapest apartment not
condemned by the local housing authority. The second problem is that
there are costs involved in reducing some expenses-housing is a good
example. If the debtor's house payment is forcibly reduced to $450 per
month, the bank (which undoubtedly does not think that the original
monthly payment was in any way excessive) is likely to insist that the
house be sold or the mortgage foreclosed. Sale of the debtor's home
under such circumstances may well bring a fire-sale price that will reduce
the debtor's assets (and may thus reduce the amount his creditors ultimately receive). Moreover, the debtor may be unable to buy new
housing and may be required to provide a hefty rent deposit, precisely
because of his economic problems.
This is not to say that housing expenses should not be reviewed by
the court. It would be difficult, to say the least, to justify ownership
of a second home; and the cost of the debtor's primary home may be

of five in budget did not make Chapter 7 filing a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy
Code).
120. 57 Bankr. at 876 (§ 707(b) case).
121. The actual comment concerning the recreation budget was: "The Court has serious
questions about the appropriateness of a debtor in Chapter 7 to be paying his wife $300.00
per month to answer the phone and be spending another $200.00 per month on recreation."
Id. at 876. (§ 707(b) case). Kress provides virtually a textbook case of the type of debtor
at which § 707(b) was aimed; the debtor had an income between $70,000 and $90,000
per year; his total unsecured debts were only $37,927. Id.
122. In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
123. In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986), perhaps reflecting its
view of the California real estate market, did not blink at a house payment of $1,255
per month.
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so great that the costs of relocation would be justified. Those costs
should be taken into account, however, before the debtor is forced to
2 4
incur them.
Just as the disposable income standard reduces the debtor's incentive
to earn, so too it reduces the debtor's incentive to minimize expenses.
To what extent can the debtor voluntarily increase his "reasonably
necessary" expenses during the plan period? For example, the debtor's
child might need orthodontic work, which the debtor has been delaying
because he does not want to spend the money. Since that money will
go to creditors if it is not used to fix the child's teeth, it literally costs
the debtor nothing to have the work done during the plan period.
There is little indication in the cases that this has been much of a
problem.'25 Potentially discretionary expenses have been measured by the
same yardstick as other expenses-whether they are nebulously reasonable
in light of the debtor's income and obligations. 2 6 One case, examining
the substantial abuse standard, suggests that the court's examination of
such issues should be very cautious, because of the interest in preserving
personal autonomy and the constitutional right of privacy in family
matters. 27 Lawyers for debtors filing Chapter 13 should, consequently,
consider whether it might be appropriate to schedule reasonable discretionary expenditures for the plan period.
The third inadequately explored issue is the effect of the disposable
income standard on the debtor's dependents. Whatever level of frugality
the court imposes on the debtor is also imposed on the debtor's family.
Should the Taff rule apply with equal force to, e.g., the debtor's children
as it does to the debtor?
It is difficult to articulate any per se reason why the debtor's
dependents should be treated the same as the debtor. Sometimes, of
course, it is the dependents who will have induced the debtor to overspend and thus to suffer bankruptcy. In other circumstances, however,
the debtor will have been as sparing with his children as with his creditors

124. It should be noted that it'is not at all clear that Jones was forced to move. The
debtor's schedules claimed monthly expenditures of $4,177.54, which included not only
the mortgage payment but $1,000 per month for private school tuition and $515 per
month for food, all of which the court found excessive. The court, however, only reduced
the debtor's permissible monthly expenses to $3,800, a reduction of a mere $377.54. 55
Bankr. at 467. Obviously, this reduction could have been dealt with by reducing "excessive"
expenses other than the mortgage payment. Other listed expenses, such as utilities, clothing,
laundry, periodicals, and transportation could also have been adjusted downward, at least
to some degree.
125. Perhaps because creditors probably have great difficulty in identifying such expenses.
126. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (§ 707(b) case).
127. Id. at 940 n.9. (bankruptcy court should not intrude into debtors' decision to
have a child, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972)).
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so as to indulge himself more fully. The difficulty with diminishing the
dependents' expectations along with the debtor's is that children have
needs unique to their age that, if left unmet, will impose severe hardship
for years to come. Education is the clearest example of such a need.
Perhaps the obvious resolution of this problem is that the expenses
we tend to view as "reasonably necessary" for children "just naturally"
differ from those we think of as being equally necessary for an adult.
In In re Jones,'28 for example, the court found private college tuition
to be an unnecessary expense 29 on the basis that "[a]n expensive private
school education is not a basic need of the Debtor's dependents, particdlarly in view of the high quality public education available in this
country at both the collegiate and secondary school levels."', 30 This
language certainly suggests that state college tuition, which might not
be a necessary expense for a forty year old debtor, would be a necessary
expense for his eighteen year old dependent.
The final unaddressed problem with lifestyle expenses is the proper
treatment of the type of debtor against whom the disposable income
standard is aimed-the high income/low asset debtor. Taff says that
the debtor's prior lifestyle is not relevant in determining the amount he
has to pay creditors. This is not, in fact, an accurate description of
the cases, nor is it clear whether it is the appropriate rule.
The disposable income cases have permitted the debtor to continue
something resembling his prior lifestyle. The debtor has not been forced
to live in bankruptcy poverty, or anywhere near bankruptcy poverty,
unless he was already poor. 3 ' This may not be fair. It may well impose

128. 55 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
129. Id.at 466-67.
130. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
131. This is evidenced by the income earned and expenses allowed in the (admittedly
few) disposable income cases that reveal those figures: In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1986) ($3,200.00 per month net-of-withholding-tax income; debtor permitted to
expend $2,492.57); In re Rushton, 58 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) ($772.00 net
income; debtor permitted to expend $582.00); In re Jones, 55 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1985) ($4,324.00 per month net income; debtor permitted to expend $3,800.00); In
re Festner, 54 Bankr. 532 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) ($1,393.00 per net month income;
expenses of $1,130 found reasonable; confirmation denied for other reasons); In re Krull,
54 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) ($1,987.00 per month income (unclear whether net
or gross); expenses of $1,502.00 found reasonable; confirmation denied for other reasons);
see also, In re Tinneberg, 59 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (no income stated; court
suggested that $837 per month projected expenses could properly be increased). Cf. In
re Perkins, 55 Bankr. 422 (Bankr N.D. Okla. 1985) ($2,387.00 per month income; use
of $1,977.00 per month by debtor did not mean plan was not in good faith); In re
Peterson, 53 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985) ($1449.00 per month income (unclear
whether net or gross); debtor permitted to expend $1,179.00; however, no creditor objected
to the proposed budget).
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a higher relative discharge cost on those who have the least. -2 While
egalitarian sentiments seem unpopular today, the problem created by
permitting Chapter 13 debtors to enjoy very different lifestyles based
on their social and economic status should at least be addressed by the
courts.
Obviously, those high income debtors would be discouraged from
filing Chapter 13 if they were forced to trim their lifestyles too severely.
If BAFJA were interpreted in a way that led to fewer reorganizations,
rather than more, its purposes presumably would be frustrated. Of
course, this problem could be alleviated by the vigorous use of Section
707(b) to force reorganization. Thus, if the courts do in time adopt a
more stringent definition of permissible lifestyle expenses, they will also
have to monitor petitions more closely for signs of substantial abuse.
6. Charitable Contributions
The courts have universally ruled that, if charity begins at home,
it ends with bankruptcy. Charitable contributions of even very modest
amounts have been forbidden.' As a general principle, this is obviously
correct. It should be self-evident that such contributions do not fit the
definition of permissible expenses, and thus this rule is not, in most
cases, even remotely controversial.
Nevertheless, one aspect of the prohibition on charity does raise
troubling questions. One disposable income case"' and at least one good
faith case'35 prohibit the debtor from tithing to his church during the
plan period. Under some circumstances, at least, such a prohibition may
come uncomfortably close to an interference with freedom of religion.
Suppose that a debtor earns $2000 per month and believes it to be
a fundamental religious duty to contribute $200 of that to his church
each month. A determination that the $200 is part of the debtor's
disposable income requires the debtor to choose between fulfilling the
religious duty and obtaining Chapter 13 relief. Worse still, if the payment

132. Compare Jones (discharge cost 12.1% of $4,324.00 per month income), Greer
(discharge cost 22% of $3,200.00 per month income) and Perkins. (discharge cost 17.2%
of $2,387.00 per month income) with Rushton (discharge cost 24.607o of $772 per month
income), Festner (discharge would have cost 18.9% of $1,393.00 per month income) and
Krull (discharge would have cost 24.4% of $1,987.00 per month income). The extremely
small size of the sample, of course, can only suggest a possible problem that may or
may not be widespread.
133. In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986) (weekly $1.50 United Way
contribution was part of disposable income).
134. In re Sturgeon, 51 Bankr. 82 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985).
135. In re Breckenridge, 12 Bankr. 159 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); cf. In re Cadogan,
4 Bankr. 598 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980) (debtor would have to reduce other expenses to
be allowed to continue tithing to church).
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of the tithe to his church rather than to his creditors means that a
Chapter 7 liquidation would be a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy
Code, the debtor would be forced to choose between that duty and any
form of bankruptcy relief.
The disposable income cases have not yet confronted this issue
directly. In re Sturgeon, the only reported disposable income case that
addresses tithing, involved an objection to confirmation by the estate
of a person whom the debtor had killed while driving under the influence
of alcohol. The court did not frame the issue in explicit religious freedom
terms; it merely categorized tithing as "a matter of conscience" rather
than a "church law" and held "that it would be more just and more
noble a gesture to offer the $140.00 per month to the Estate of Christopher Helmsing. ' 36 Sturgeon does leave open the possibility that a
different result might be warranted in other circumstances, e.g., those
in which the debtor's church mandated tithing as a condition of membership. A later Section 707(b) case, In re Gaukler, which involved
debtors who belonged to a church that mandated tithing, held that the
debtors' "tithing" of $672.48 per month from a net income of $1,802.56
per month did not render their Chapter 7 petition a substantial abuse.'

At least one other Section 707(b) case has reviewed the same issue.

In re Edwards3 8 held that the debtors were not substantially abusing

Chapter 7 even though their proposed budget included a monthly contribution of $100 to their church.3

9

The court viewed this decision as

a personal one comparable in constitutional significance to another decision the couple had made, to bear another child:
[l]t may be questioned whether church contributions of $100 a

month should come ahead of repayment to creditors. Having a
fourth child may be a questionable luxury. At what point such
inquiries and decisions by a bankruptcy court would become an
affront to society's sensibilities or the U.S. Constitution remains
uncertain. '4'

136. 51 Bankr. at 83-84.
137. 63 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. N.D. 1986). The court did, however, comment (perhaps
inappropriately) on the tithing, which it characterized as "smack[ing] of irresponsibility"
and the product of "a quite stern and uncaring religion that ... require[d] faithful
adherence to such a level of giving when the persons being asked to give are jeopardizing
the welfare of their family in the course of compliance." Id. at 226.
138. 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (§ 707(b) case).
139. Id. at 940.
140. Id. at 940 n.9. Cf. In re Gaukler, 63 Bankr. at 226:
This is ultimately, however, a matter between the debtors and God. This Court
will not presume to know by what avenue one ought to seek salvation ....
The debtors seem quite sincere in their conviction and this court is not so
presumptuous as to inflict its personal views of religious and financial respon-
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Edwards and Gaukler may reflect nothing more than the appropriate
distinction between the substantial abuse standard of Section 707(b) and
the disposable income standard of Section 1325(b).' 4' The Edwards court
itself suggested that Chapter 13 might not be an attractive alternative
for the debtors because of the greater constraints the disposable income
42
standard would impose upon them.
7. Disposable Income and Good Faith
As noted, many pre-BAFJA courts read into the requirement that
the Chapter 13 plan be proposed in good faith an obligation to pay
creditors as much as was, in the court's view, fair or even as much as
was feasible. 4 This was especially so if the debtor was obtaining a
discharge of debts that would not be dischargeable in Chapter 7. To
what extent, if any, do these precedents survive the enactment of the
disposable income standard?
To date, it does not even appear to have occurred to most courts
that this problem should be addressed. For example, in In re Akin,'"
in which the court declined confirmation of the debtor's plan because
of its failure to meet the disposable income standard,' 45 the court listed
eleven factors to consider in evaluating whether the plan was proposed
in good faith. At least four of these factors related directly or indirectly

sibility upon them .... As noted by their counsel, no Court has suggested
that a debtor must give up good faith religious beliefs and obligations in order
to come within the ambit of Chapter 7.
141. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
142. 50 Bankr. at 940 n.9.
143. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
144. 54 Bankr. 700 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985). A number of other cases similarly indicate
that the good faith requirement affects the amount the debtor must pay under the plan.
See, e.g., In re Kazzaz, 62 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re Whitehead, 61
Bankr. 397 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986);
In re Rushton, 58 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986); In re Perkins, 55 Bankr. 422
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985). Contra In re Red, 60 Bankr. 113, 116 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986): "Thus, where the requirements of the § 1325(b) 'ability-to-pay' provisions are met,
this court need not further inquire into the degree of substantiality of repayment of
unsecured debt under the plan as a factor in assessing the 'good faith' of a chapter 13
plan under § 1325(a)(3)." See also 5 Collier on Bankruptcy
1325.0413), p. 1325-17 (L.
King. 15th ed. 1986):
[Tlhe 1984 amendments to the Code finally resolve the issue of whether any
particular amount must be paid to unsecured creditors above that required by
the best interests of creditors test. Since Congress has not dealt with the issue
quite specifically in the ability-to-pay provisions, there is no longer any reason
for the amount of a debtor's payments to be considered as even a part of the
good faith standard.
145. 54 Bankr. at 703.
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to the amount of payments to be made under the plan. 4 6 Obviously,
none of the payment-related factors would be relevant if the disposable
income standard had displaced good faith as the measure of plan payments.
In re Krulli47 goes much further. In Krull, the likelihood that the
debtor's income would increase led the court to require that he pay
half of that increase to creditors tinder the plan. 48 It is reasonably clear

that the court imposed this requirement under the good faith provision
rather than the disposable income provision:
A review of the 11 factors [for determining good faith] analyzed

in the context of the facts and circumstances surrounding this
filing is essential for a resolution of the good faith issue. The

factors are as follows:
(2)

The debtor's employment history, ability to earn and like-

lihood of future increases in income. It is apparent that the
debtor has the potential to earn much more than his schedules
currently reflect ... yet the proposed plan makes no provision
49
for future increases.
There is simply nothing in the Code that supports the continued
use of the good faith requirement to impose payment obligations on

146. These were:
(I) the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the debtor's
surplus;
(2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and likelihood of future
increases in income;
(3) the probable or expected duration of the plan;
(7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is
non-dischargeable in Chapter 7.
Id. at 702.
147. 54 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
148. Id. at 378; see supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 377. The Krull court also drew a clear distinction between the payment
of projected income required by § 1325(b)(I)(B) and the additional obligation it was
imposing:
Therefore, the amended plan should require the debtor to pa5 50 percent of
any net earnings, above and beyond the amount scheduled, into the plan for
distribution to the creditors. This provision does not conflict with the requirement
in Section 1325(b)(I)(B) that all of the debtor's projected disposable income be
paid into the plan because, "as of the effective date of the plan," all the
debtor's projected income is provided for. Earnings above and beyond the
amount scheduled are too speculative at this point as to be regarded as "projected" income.
Id. at 378.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

the debtor. That the good faith requirement was ever so used is controversial. 5 10 The potential for "abuse" of Chapter 13 prior to BAFJA
was such that perhaps the expansive reading given to good faith was
justifiable. Such is no longer the case, however, since the imposition of
the disposable income standard and the ability of creditors to force
modification if the debtor's income does indeed rise' now provide
adequate safeguards.
IlI.
A.

THE IMPACT OF THE DISPOSABLE INCOME REQUIREMENT

In General

At least one early study of the disposable income standard expressed
concern that, by increasingthe cost of a Chapter 13 discharge, Congress
had discouraged consumer Chapter 13 proceedings. 5 2 Although the available statistics are rather spotty, this does not appear to be the case.'
Chapter 13 proceedings appear to be about as popular now as they
were before BAFJA. There may be several reasons for this.

150. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Of course, there is no question that
good faith is still a relevant inquiry with regard to matters other than the amount to be
paid; it is clearly a prerequisite to confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX3) (1982).
151. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
152. Black & Herbert, supra note 3, at 868-70.
153. According to In re Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 550 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) there
were 108,059 Chapter 13 cases filed in calendar year 1985. This compares favorably, in
numbers at least, with the 1979-82 filing rates shown in the GAO Report at 2, and the
reported Chapter 13 filings for the years ending June 30, 1981 (86,778 of 360,329 bankruptcy cases were filed under Chapter 13, or 24% of the total cases); 1982 (98,705 of
367,866 cases (27%)); 1983 (102,201 of 374,734 cases (27%)) and 1984 (91,358 of 344,275
cases (27%)). U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 522
(1986). Figures for the year ending June 30, 1985 also appear comparable to prior years'
figures. They show a total of 98,452 Chapter 13 cases among 364,536 Bankruptcy cases27% of the total filings. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States 464
(1985). The June 30, 1985 numbers include both pre-BAFJA and post-BAFJA cases, since
BAFJA went into effect on October 10, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 392 § 553(a)
(1984).
Even more striking, if less broadly based, are the unpublished monthly case summaries
of the Norfolk and Newport News divisions of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. (Available from Professor Michael J. Herbert, T. C.
Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, Virginia). During calendar years 1982
and 1983, the last two full years before BAFJA, the Chapter 13 cases ranged between
707 and 21% of total filings each month. For the year 1982, Chapter 13 proceedings
were 16% of all filings (380 of 2,337); for the year 1983, Chapter 13 proceedings were
14% of all filings (324 of 2,287). In 1985, the first full year after BAFJA, the Chapter
13 cases ranged between 13% and 18% of the total filings each month, and were 15%
of all filings for the year (454 of 2,994). In the first eight months of 1986, Chapter 13
cases ranged between 15% and 20% of the total filings each month, and were 18% of
all filings for that time period (470 of 2,616).
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The first is that creditors do not seem to file many objections to
Chapter 13 plans. It was hypothesized that objections would become
routine.' This apparently has not happened.'55 Indeed, given the paucity
of reported disposable income cases, there seem to be fewer objections
now than there were before BAFJA (or at any rate, fewer meriting
published opinions). This might be due to debtors' proposing plans that
are more satisfactory to their creditors so as to avoid objections. It
may also be due to the normal time lag between the creation of a legal
standard and its utilization by litigants. 5 6 Or it may simply reflect the
long-observed passivity of creditors in Chapter 13 proceedings.'" The
amounts of money involved in the typical Chapter 13 case discourage
much creditor activity and have led to the present system in which
creditor participation is reduced to a minimum.'
Curiously, it appears that no major creditor has attempted to mitigate
this cost-and make objections economically feasible-by creating hypothetical "disposable income profiles" for debtors. It would be quite
easy for a major lender to develop such profiles from their own credit
scoring systems. Since those systems are used to measure ability to pay
before the loan is made, they could also be used to measure ability to
pay after Chapter 13 has been filed. The cost of making the projection
(which would be slight) and the cost of filing that projection, with an
accompanying objection, (which would also be slight) would be the only
expenses the creditor would have to incur. Moreover, if courts came to
accept such profiles as a baseline for measuring disposable income, the
need for objections would diminish as debtors' lawyers learned to draft
plans that initially conformed to the profiles.
It is also curious (and perhaps somewhat disturbing) that Chapter
13 trustees rarely file objections to Chapter 13 plans. In theory at least,
the trustee should not be dissuaded from her duty to review the plan
and, in proper circumstances, object to it by the small size of the estate.
In any event, it is obvious that the trustee ought not to allow herself

154. Black & Herbert, supra note 3, at 865.
155. Nevertheless, this possibility cannot be entirely discounted for the future, at least
not while a creditor can be found who is willing to squabble over $12.00 per month for
magazines (see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text) or $1.50 per month for United
Way (see supra note 133).
156. This hypothesis seems exceedingly improbable for one rather simple reason. The
consumer credit industry was deeply involved in the revision process and thus must surely
have been aware of the implications of the disposable income standard. On the other
hand, the fact that a number of cases still seem to be reviewing the amount of payments
under the good faith standard (see supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text), leads
one to conclude that the implications of the disposable income standard may not have
sunk in for some part of the lending community.
157. See Girth, supra note 12, at 60-63.
158. Id.at 60-61.
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to be so dissuaded. Perhapsvery few Chapter 13 plans are objectionable;
perhaps some trustees do not take their obligations as seriously as they
should.
The second major reason for the mininial impact of disposable
income on Chapter 13's popularity is that there is a distinctive market
for Chapter 13. Some debtors need its broader discharge provisions. As
long as the cost of meeting the disposable income standard is less than
the cost of not having the debts discharged, Chapter 13 remains attractive.'5 9 Other debtors have the desire to "square" things with their
creditors, and Chapter 13 may be an efficient way of meeting this
perceived moral obligation. Indeed, many such people may already be
complying with the disposable income standard. 60
The third reason for the continued popularity of Chapter 13 is that
the disposable income standard may not have raised the cost of Chapter
13 proceedings in fact as much as it did in theory. As noted above,
there is some history of debtors proposing generous Chapter 13 plans
for moral reasons. Moreover, many plans have been subjected to variations of the good faith-best efforts-reasonable efforts requirement for
years. Disposable income could conceivably require less from the debtor
than any payment-based good faith standard and certainly less than
would be produced by his best efforts.
The final reason, which is closely related to the third, is that the
initial cases, at least, have shown the courts to be reluctant to trim
severely the debtor's lifestyle. While the "collection" oriented courts are
capable of quite harsh rhetoric, the bottom-line differences between
acceptable and unacceptable plans are relatively modest, except with
regard to savings. 6 Thus, the creditors' objections, even when sustained,
do not generally produce large increases in the payments under the plan.
The simple truth is that, if the reported cases are indicative of the
typical disposable income case, debtors are not actually being forced to
pay their disposable income to their creditors, at least in the sense that
the Purdue Study defined disposable income. Fears that Section 1325(b)
would render Chapter 13 unpopular were based on the assumption that
something approaching bankruptcy poverty would be enforced. The courts
have not done this, and their restraint has simultaneously dampened
creditor ardor and muted the disincentive for debtors to file Chapter
13.
If the courts alter their philosophy regarding disposable income, and
creditor passivity ends, the bankruptcy courts could find themselves with

159. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
160. The proposal of an average 57% payment to creditors is strong evidence of some
debtors' desire to pay as much as (or perhaps even more than) is feasible. See supra
note 17.
161. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.

19861

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

a serious docket problem. An ad hoc standard like disposable income
requires a degree of individual attention that might be difficult to provide
if objections were filed in a substantial number of Chapter 13 cases.
There is, however, little reason to believe that the pattern of the first
two years after BAFJA will prove abnormal or that the amount of
disposable income litigation will sharply increase.
B.

High Income/Low Asset Debtors

As suggested previously, it should be obvious that the debtors most
likely to respond to the disposable income standard by avoiding Chapter
13 are those for whom that standard was designed-the high income/
low asset debtor who has the wherewithal to pay a large portion of his
debts but for whom an asset-based bankruptcy would be cheap and
easy. His ability to evade the disposable income requirement has been
sharply curtailed by Section 707(b). Such a debtor is now faced with a
dilemma-if he files for liquidation, the court may find that his income
disqualifies him from relief. If he files for reorganization under Chapter
13, his relief may be very expensive. This is precisely the dilemma the
Congress intended to create by its adoption of Sections 1325(b) and
707(b). To what extent has its effort succeeded?
One obvious limitation is the severe procedural constraint placed on
Section 707(b). Only the court can object to the petition on the grounds
of substantial abuse. 62 Yet it is the creditors who are perhaps most
sensitive to it.

162. See supra note 45. This limitation, which imposes on the court the awkward
obligation to become a semi-litigant in the proceeding, sits poorly with some judgessee, e.g., In re Campbell, 63 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986). At least one bankruptcy
judge has resorted to poetry:
If my motion, it was granted and an appeal came to be,
Who would be the appellee?
Surely, it would not be me.
Who would file, but pray tell me,
a learned brief for the appellee The District Judge would not do so
At least this much I do know.
In re Love, 61 Bankr. 558, 559 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
With regard to the court's ability to consider a § 707(b) dismissal after a creditor has
improperly moved for such dismissal, see In re Campbell (motion by creditor, although
improper, does not prevent the court from making an independent investigation of substantial abuse question), and Black & Herbert, supra note 53, at 856-57 (court may dismiss
if acting independently of creditor's motion). Contra, In re Christian, 51 Bankr. 118
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1985); see also, the statement of Sen. Metzenbaum regarding this matter:
I also am extremely pleased that this bill prohibits creditors from filing motions
attempting to deny bankruptcy relief to individuals because of substantial abuse.
If a creditor asks a court to dismiss a case claiming that there has been substantial
abuse of the bankruptcy laws by the debtor, the court would not be allowed
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There is another escape valve for such debtors-Chapter 11. There
is no doubt that virtually any debtor who has business obligations, and
almost no doubt that virtually all consumer debtors, are eligible for
relief under that chapter. 6 The additional costs and complexity of
Chapter 11 proceedings will discourage most debtors from pursuing that
route, but the high rollers are surely not among them.
The reason why Chapter 11 will be increasingly attractive is that it
can be cheaper to the debtor than a Chapter 13 proceeding. 64 The
Chapter 11 debtor is not automatically required to pay his disposable
income to creditors; he is only required to pay them as little in excess
of the liquidation value of his assets as he can get them to accept.' 65
If the debtor or the debtor's attorney is a sufficiently skilled negotiator,
this may be considerably less than is required by a court reviewing the
disposable income standard.
IV. CONCLUSION

Section 1325(b), coupled with Section 707(b), creates an uneasy and
fluid compromise between the tradition of asset based bankruptcy and
the desire of at least some creditors to force at least some debtors to
devote their future income to their debts. This section somewhat reduces
the impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act's attempt to lure debtors into
reorganization, because it requires a potentially substantial quid-pro-quo
for the benefits of Chapter 13. Nevertheless, contrary to some early
fears, it appears that the additional burden imposed has not greatly
reduced the attractiveness of Chapter 13.
In part the popularity of Chapter 13 is due to the wide discretion
which the courts have exercised in applying the standard; despite protestations to the contrary, this discretion has generally been exercised
in favor of permitting the debtor to maintain some semblance of his
prior lifestyle. This discretion raises two questions that to date have
been of more philosophical than practical significance. At what point
does the court's review of the minutiae of a debtor's financial life
become an unwarranted intrusion into personal autonomy? And to what
extent is it fair to permit a high-income debtor to retain an approximately
upper-middle class lifestyle? Both of these problems could have been
alleviated by the imposition of a more objective standard, e.g., the

to do so.
130 Cong. Rec. S7624 (daily ed. June 19, 1984). Unfortunately, Senator Metzenbaum's
remarks are those of only one senator, and can be read to say either that the judge
cannot grant the creditor's motion or that he cannot grant dismissal at all.
163. See generally Herbert, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. See Herbert, supra note 9, at 615-18.

1986]

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

83

poverty line standard suggested by the Purdue Study. That, however,
was a political impossibility. It would also have created ethical dilemmas
at least as acute as those created by disposable income.
The reality of bankruptcy is that it is overwhelmingly a system of
debt discharge. Only a relatively small fraction of the total number of
bankruptcy cases filed each year involve any distribution of property to
unsecured creditors. Of those cases, only a portion are filed under
Chapter 13. Disposable income will be an issue in only a fraction of
a fraction of a fraction. The disposable income provision thus raises
the cost of discharge for only a handful of debtors; to date at least,
the increased cost has been fairly modest. There is thus little reason to
believe that Section 1325(b) has transformed either Chapter 13 or the
Bankruptcy Code.

